Correctly Using Regular Expressions for Secure Input Validation

by the OpenSSF Best Practices Working Group

Introduction

A key part of developing secure software is input validation, that is, validating that untrusted input (at least) is checked so that only valid data is accepted. For example, if a value is supposed to be an integer, then the software must only accept integers for that value and reject anything else. Sometimes a particular data type (like an integer or email address) is so common that libraries and frameworks include validators for them; in such cases, consider using them. However, many applications have application-specific patterns that also need input validation.

Regular expressions (aka regexes) can be a great way to validate input against specialized patterns. They’re widely available, widely understood, flexible, and efficient. However, they must be used correctly. A lot of advice is wrong or omits key points. In particular:

  1. Only data that completely matches that pattern should be accepted (by using a “fullmatch” or by adding the correct anchors at the pattern’s beginning and end).
  2. The “|” operator, which lets you list alternatives, has an operator precedence that requires developers to parenthesize the set of alternatives when using it for input validation.
  3. Regex language syntax varies between different platforms; it is not standard. In particular, the “$” anchor does not only match the end of the string in Python and PHP, but it does in JavaScript. You must use the correct symbols for the platform you’re using. Developers reusing a regex from the Internet must translate it to its target platform.

Doing input validation wrong, such as incorrectly using “^” or “$”, could lead to vulnerabilities.

Guidance

When using regexes for secure validation of untrusted input, do the following so they’ll be correctly interpreted:

  1. Where possible, use a method, function, or flag that requires that the pattern only match if it matches the entire input. For example, in Python3 (but not Python2), use re.fullmatch for input validation when practical.
  2. If you can’t do that:
    1. If there are any branches (“|”), make sure the alternatives are grouped. You can do this by surrounding them with parentheses like this: “(aa|bb)”. If you don’t need the groups to be captured (you usually don’t), and your platform supports non-capturing groups (most do), it’s usually more efficient to use non-capturing groups - just change “(“ into “(?:”
    2. Use a regular expression in its normal mode (not “multiline” mode). Prepend a start-of-string marking (often “^” or “\A”) and append an “end-of-string” marking (often “$” or “\z”, but Python uses “\Z”). Do not use “$” for input validation until you verify that “$” does what you want. See this table for many common platforms:
Platform Prepend Append $ Permissive?
POSIX BRE, POSIX ERE, and ECMAScript (JavaScript) “^” (not “\A”) “$” (not “\z” nor “\Z”) No
Perl, .NET/C# “^” or “\A” “\z” (not “$”) Yes
Java “^” or “\A” “\z”; “$” works but some documents conflict No
PHP “^” or “\A” “\z”; “$” with “D” modifier Yes
PCRE “^” or “\A” “\z”; “$” with PCRE2_ DOLLAR_ENDONLY Yes
Golang, Rust crate regex, and RE2 “^” or “\A” “\z” or “$” No
Python “^” or “\A” “\Z” (not “$” nor “\z”) Yes
Ruby “\A” (not “^”) “\z” (not “$”) Yes

For example, to validate in JavaScript that the input is only “ab” or “de”, use the regex “^(ab|de)$”. To validate the same thing in Python, use “^(ab|de)\Z” or “\A(ab|de)\Z”. Note that the “$” anchor has different meanings among platforms and is often misunderstood; on many platforms it’s permissive by default and doesn’t match only the end of the input. Instead of using “$” on a platform if $ is permissive, consider using an explicit form instead (e.g., “\n?\z”). Consider preferring “\A” and “\z” where it’s supported (this is necessary when using Ruby).

In addition, ensure your regex is not vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack. A ReDoS “is a Denial of Service attack, that exploits the fact that most Regular Expression implementations may reach extreme situations that cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size)”. Many regex implementations are “backtracking” implementations, that is, they try all possible matches. In these implementations, a poorly-written regular expression can be exploited by an attacker to take a vast amount of time.

  1. One solution is to use a regex implementation that does not have this vulnerability because it never backtracks. E.g., use Go’s default regex system, RE2, or on .NET enable the RegexOptions.NonBacktracking option. Non-backtracking implementations can sometimes be orders of magnitude faster, but they also omit some features (e.g., backreferences).
  2. Alternatively, create regexes that require no or little backtracking. Where a branch (“|”) occurs, the next character should select one branch. Where there is optional repetition (e.g., “*”), the next character should determine if there is a repetition or not. One common cause of unnecessary backtracking are poorly-written regexes with repetitions in repetitions, e.g., “(a+)*”. Some tools can help find these defects.
  3. A partial countermeasure is to greatly limit the length of the untrusted input and/or the number of repetitions. This can limit the impact of a vulnerability. For example, in a regex, use “{0,4}” (0 through 4 repetitions inclusive) instead of “*” (0 or more repetitions, with no maximum).

Detailed Rationale

For detailed rationale, along with other information such as contributor credits, see Correctly Using Regular Expressions for Secure Input Validation - Rationale.

Our thanks to Seth Larson, whose article Seth Larson’s Regex character “$” doesn’t mean “end-of-string” raised awareness of some of the problems dicussed here.

Contributions and Corrections Welcome

If you have any additions, changes, or corrections you’d like to suggest, please open an issue or create a pull request. We appreciate your contributions!

License

This document is released under the Creative Commons CC-BY-4.0 license.

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